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19671
SEAMEN -

PERSONAL INJURIES -

CHOICE OF LAW

Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 368 F.2d 426
(2d Cir. 1966).

There is considerable controversy surrounding choice-of-law
problems in tort cases involving more than one state,' and questions
with respect to choice of law similarly arise when torts occur aboard
ocean-going ships. On numerous occasions federal courts have had
to decide whether or not to apply the provisions of Section 20 of
the Jones Act' in cases involving alien seamen and foreign vessels.3
In the recent case of Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp.,4

a Greek seaman brought suit against the Greek corporation which
owned the ship on which he was employed. The principal shareholder of the defendant was a Greek citizen who had been a permanent resident alien in New York for three years. The corporation
conducted approximately half of its business from New York and
the other half from Piraeus, Greece. At the time of his injury
which occurred aboard ship in New York harbor, the plaintiff was
engaged in work pertaining to the New York portion of the corporate business. He was a domiciliary of Greece, and his contract
of employment, signed in Greece, provided that Greek law would
govern any claim arising out of his employment. The ship sailed
under the Greek flag.5
The district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim was affirmed by the Second Circuit which, in applying the rules laid down
by the Supreme Court in Lauritzen v. Larsen,6 held that Section 20
of the Jones Act does not provide a remedy for an alien seaman
against an alien shipowner for a tort committed in an American
7
port.

1 For example, one case, Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 NXE.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), was the subject of discussion for several noted scholars in one
issue of a law review. Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in
Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1212 (1963). One of those scholars has recently published a book on choice of law. CAVERs, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS
(1965).
241 Star. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
3
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); Lauritzen
v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
-1368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1966).
5Id. at 426-27.
(1345 U.S. 571 (1953).
7368 F.2d at 429. The plaintiff could have brought the action in maritime tort
under the court's admiralty jurisdiction. Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 390-91 (1959) (concurring opinion of Brennan, J.). The plaintiff

1762

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18: 1761

The Lauritzen case involved a Danish seaman who sued a Danish shipowner for injuries sustained aboard a Danish flag vessel in
the harbor of Havana, Cuba. The Supreme Court held that the
Jones Act was inapplicable and that the action had been properly
dismissed.8
In Lauritzen the Court listed several factors influencing the
choice of law in maritime tort cases. It found the "place of the
tort" to be of very limited importance in maritime cases because of
the many different legal authorities involved in waters navigated by
vessels in international commerce.' The "flag of the vessel" was
considered the most significant factor. By virtue of a legal fiction,
the ship is considered to be part of the territory of the nation flying
the flag. A more realistic theory underlying the "law of the flag"
approach is that it is the most practical rule to apply since it does
not change as the ship travels." The "allegiance or domicile of
the plaintiff" was listed as a factor" which favored Danish law in2
Lauritzen and would naturally favor Greek law in the instant case.'
The "allegiance of the shipowner" in Lauritzen dearly favored the
application of Danish law since the shipowner was a "Dane by nationality and domicile."'" In Tsakonites, however, the owner of
ninety-six percent of the stock of the defendant corporation was a
4
New York domiciliary.'
An eminent authority has stated that the Lauritzen case "necessarily left unresolved all the possible combinations of 'contacts'
which are not exactly the Lauritzen combination (which was almost
the weakest possible case for the application of domestic law)."' "
was undoubtedly seeking to avail himself of the liberal provisions of the Jones Act
which incorporates the provisions of the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 35 Stat. 66
(1908), as amended 45 U.S.C. §§ 53-54 (1964), mitigating the severity of common law
defenses. The Jones Act also provides for a jury trial, which is not available in admiralty suits.
8 345 U.S. 571, 592-93 (1953).
9 Id. at 583.
30Id. at 584-86.
11 Id. at 586-87.
' 2 Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 368 F.2d 426 (2d Cit. 1966) in which
the plaintiff was a citizen and domiciliary of Greece. It could well be argued that this
factor should be more important than the flag of the vessel. The "flag" rule promotes
uniformity of choice of law while the domicile of the plaintiff provides a means of determining which nation has an interest in the case.
'3 345 U.S. at 588.
14 368 F.2d at 427. The allegiance or domicile of the defendant indicates a real
interest which one nation has in the case, and this factor might therefore be given more
weight than the law of the flag by a court which is more concerned with balancing the
interests of the two nations than in providing for uniformity of choice of law.
15 GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 6-63, at 387 (1957).
In addition to the con-

19671

CHOICE OF LAW

1763

Tsakonites involved two significant contacts with the United States
which were not involved in Lauritzen. First, the tort in Lauritzen
occurred in a foreign port (Havana), while the tort in Tsakonites
occurred in American territorial waters (New York harbor). Second, in Lauritzen the defendant shipowner was neither a citizen nor
a domiciliary of the United States, but in Tsakonites a considerable
portion of the defendant corporation's business was conducted from
New York by its principal shareholder who had been a permanent
resident alien for three years.
The court in Tsakonites seems to have been on firm ground in
finding that the fact the tort occurred in American waters was not
sufficient to require application of the Jones Act. In Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co.," a tort occurred in American waters, but the Supreme Court refused to apply the Jones Act
to the suit between an alien plaintiff and an alien shipowner, although it did permit the plaintiff's suit as to other defendants who
Romero merely elaborates and
were United States citizens.'
strengthens the Court's position in Lauritzen that the place of tort
tacts already discussed, the Court in Lauritzen listed the "place of contract" which it
considered irrelevant in maritime tort cases even though significant in actions for maintenance and cure which are based on an implied contract theory. 345 U.S. at 588-89.
The court in Tsakonites stressed the fact that the plaintiff had contracted for the application of Greek law. Yet, in admitting that the plaintiff "doubtless did not have the
slightest knowledge of the provisions of American statutes;' the court demonstrated the
weakness of its own argument. 368 F.2d at 429. The contract was obviously one of
adhesion since the plaintiff had neither the knowledge nor the bargaining power to
have that term changed. Cf. Stratheam S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920) where
the Court applied a federal statute to an alien seaman's suit for wages, the payment of
which would naturally be more closely related to the contract between the seaman and
his employer than a tort action would be.
The Lauritzen case pointed out that the "inaccessibility of a foreign forum" was
relevant only to the forum non conveniens issue of whether the court, after finding its
own law inapplicable, should hear the case and apply foreign law. 345 U.S. at 589-90.
The "law of the forum" was cursorily dismissed by the Court which felt that the objective of choice of law rules is to promote a uniform treatment of the case regardless of
the forum chosen. Id. at 590.
16 358 U.S. 354 (1959). The real significance of Romero is that it clarified the
relationship between jurisdiction and choice of law in the Jones Act cases. The assertion of a substantial Jones Act claim in the petition gives a federal court jurisdiction
to determine whether the Jones Act provides the remedy which the plaintiff is seeking.
Id. at 359. Thus, although the assertion of a substantial Jones Act claim will give the
federal court jurisdiction, such jurisdiction will not be exercised unless the court finds
the Jones Act applicable as a matter of choice of law. Maritime tort claims do not
"arise under" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964). 358 U.S. at 378-80.
Admiralty cases are in a special category covered by 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964). Diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964), was not available as a means for the plaintiff
in Romero to hold the alien ship owner, since the plaintiff was also an alien. This
would similarly be true in Tsakonites since both the plaintiff and the defendant were
Greek citizens.
17 358 U.S. at 384-85.
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is of little significance in maritime tort cases."8 Although Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in Romero on the theory that the case had
sufficient contact with the United States to require the application
of American law,'" the majority's position seems to be in line with
the general rule on the subject.2"
The fact that the principal shareholder in Tsakonites was a permanent resident alien is of considerably greater significance than the
fact that the tort occurred in American waters, as evidenced by the
fact that one out of the three Second Circuit judges dissented on the
basis of the former contact.2'
The courts have not hesitated to refuse to apply the "law of the
flag" where American shipowners "attempt to evade the more rigorous shipping restrictions imposed by the Jones Act."2 One such
case was Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc.2" where an alien
seaman who was a domiciliary of the United States was permitted to
recover under the Jones Act. The court, in piercing two corporate
veils, ignored the fact that the vessel flew a foreign flag, because it
found that the vessel was actually under the ownership and control
of United States citizens.24 Admittedly several minor contacts25 with
the United States were present in Bartholomew that were absent in
Tsakonites, but the case is persuasive because of the realistic approach taken by the court in imposing Jones Act liability. Similar
18 For a discussion of this position, see text accompanying note 9 supra.

19
358 U.S. at 389.
20
see RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcTs OF LAW § 405 (Student ed. 1934). In The
Paula, 91 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 750 (1937), the court applied the
"law of the flag" rather than the Jones Act to a suit between aliens where the tort occurred aboard ship in an American port. The court thought that "the intention to legislate for alien seamen who have signed articles abroad on a foreign ship ought to be
dearly expressed before the courts extend the statute to them." Id. at 1004. But cf.
Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 179 F.2d 597 (2d Cit. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
915 (1951) in which an alien plaintiff recovered under the Jones Act against an alien
defendant for a tort occurring aboard a ship flying a foreign flag on the high seas; Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 151 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1945) in which the Jones Act applied
where both the plaintiff and the defendant were Greeks, the ship was flying a Greek
flag, and the tort occurred while the plaintiff was ashore in an American port. Taylor
was overruled sub silentio by the Supreme Court in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571
(1953). Lauritzen also weakened the reasoning, if not the holding, of Kyriakos which
was distinguishable because the tort in the latter occurred on shore in an American port.
21368 F.2d at 429.
22 See Comment, 53 MICH. L. REv. 100, 109 (1954).
22 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959).
2

4 Id. at 442.

25 The

plaintiff, although an alien, was a domiciliary of the United States. The
articles were signed in Baltimore, and the injury occurred in American waters. Id. at
441. None of these factors were considered very significant in Lauritzen. See note 15
supra and text accompanying notes 9 & 11 supra.
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results have been reached in other cases26 involving American citizens operating vessels under foreign flags.
In his dissent in Tsakonites, Judge Waterman points out the
anomaly which the court's decision permits.27 The principal shareholder of the defendant corporation succeeded in insulating himself
from Jones Act liability by interposing a corporate veil, by maintaining his alien status while residing in the United States, and by
conducting only half of his corporation's business from New York,
This seems repugnant to the theory that resident aliens have not
only approximately the same rights as American citizens but also
the same liabilities2 8 To differentiate Tsakonites from Bartholomew" on the basis of alien versus United States citizenship is to
make a distinction without a real difference.
Although the case of Richards v. United States"0 indicates that
the Supreme Court recognizes and approves the trend in the direction of the "grouping of contacts" test,3 ' the Court issued a caveat
in Romero v. InternationalTerminal Operating Co.: 2 "The controlling considerations are the interacting interests of the United States
and of foreign countries, and in assessing them we must move with
the circumspection appropriate when this Court is adjudicating issues inevitably entangled in the conduct of our international relations.""3 Thus, although Romero is a mandate for a court deciding
26 Carroll v. United States, 133 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1943) in which an alien plaintiff
recovered against the United States, the owner of the ship, for a tort occurring on the
high seas on a vessel operated by a New York corporation under a foreign flag, Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 642 (1932) in
which an American seaman recovered for an injury suffered on the high seas on board
an American-owned ship flying an Honduran flag.
27 368 F.2d at 430.
28
In Leonhard v. Eley, 151 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1945), the court stated:
Aliens residing in the United States, so long as they are permitted by the
government to remain therein, are entitled generally, with respect to the rights
of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility, to the
safeguards of the Constitution and to the protection of our laws.... Their
duties and obligations, so long as they reside in the United States, do not differ materially from those of native-born or naturalized citizens. Id. at 410.
29 Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 1000 (1959). For a discussion of Bartholomew and similar cases, see notes
23-26 supra and accompanying text.
30 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
31 Id. at 12-13.
32 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
33 Id. at 383.
Mr. Justice Brennan, who dissented, concurred in this part of the
Court's reasoning. Id. at 414. Professor Cavers does not believe that international
choice-of-law problems are sufficiently different from those in an interstate situation
so as to require a different approach. CAVERS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 117. He does,
however, recognize some differences. Id. at 117-20.
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choice of law questions in a case involving the United States and a
foreign nation, the Court dearly did not rule out the alternative of
applying United States law in a case involving more substantial con34
tact with the United States than did Romero.
Although interstate choice of law problems do differ significandy from international choice of law problems, a brief examination of some of these cases may assist in an analysis of the admiralty
situation. In interstate conflicts of law, the venerable "place of
tort" 5 rule is rapidly being supplanted by a "grouping of contacts"
3

test.

6 the New York
In the leading case of Babcock v. Jackson,"
Court of Appeals rejected the "place of tort" rule which was based
on the "vested rights" doctrine that the right was created by the law
of the place of the tort and was therefore wholly controlled by that
37
law.
Babcock and similar cases 8 were based on the theory that this
rule was often harsh and inflexible because the place of tort was
frequently a fortuitous circumstance."9 These courts have sought to
decide the cases in terms of conflicting policy considerations 4 or
conflicting interests of the states involved4 1 rather than to apply the
more mechanical rule of place of tort."
3

4 In Romero the only contact with the United States was the fact that the tort occurred in American waters.
35 Recent cases adopting the new rule include: Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa.
1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
For a discussion of this new test, see text accompanying notes 47-50 inLfra.
36 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279,240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
37 Id. at 477-78, 191 N.E.2d at 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
88
E.g., Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
89 In Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 125, 209 N.E.2d 792, 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d
463, 467 (1965), the New York Court of Appeals refused to apply the rule it had announced in Babcock because the plaintiff and the defendant had chosen to live in another state for the summer, and it was not mere fortuity which led to their involvement in an accident in another state.
40 E.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 41-42, 172 N.E.2d 526,
529, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 137-38 (1961) where the court found the Massachusetts damage limit inapplicable in a wrongful death action because it conflicted with New York's
strong policy favoring unlimited damages.
41
E.g., Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) in which
the court found that the state where the tort occurred had "relatively little interest in
the measure of damages." Id. at 23, 203 A.2d at 806.
42
In Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594, 596-97 (Del. 1965), the court refused to
adopt the new rule and mechanically applied the place of tort rule even though its
effect was to deny recovery to a Delaware plaintiff in a case where the new test would
have permitted recovery.
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Two recent cases43 involving international choice of law have
applied the conflicting interest approach which is used in interstate cases. In both instances the Brazilian damage limit (which
amounted to less than two hundred dollars) was applied by a federal court to limit the recovery of an American plaintiff against a
Brazilian airline. Brazil's interest in protecting its infant airline
industry from large damage claims was held to outweigh the United

States' interest in the compensation of the plaintiff, which was
largely illusory anyway because compensation from other sources
was assured. 44
Application of this interest analysis to Tsakonites should lead
to the choice of United States law. Greece has an interest in protecting its shipowner from Jones Act liability, but that interest is
far weaker than the interest of Brazil in its airlines. The airlines
were an infant industry in Brazil, but the shipping industry of
Greece is well established. In Tsakonites the burden on the Greek
shipowner will be offset by improved compensation of the Greek
plaintiff, but in the Brazilian cases the plaintiffs were American. In
the Brazilian cases the United States' interest was in compensating
the American plaintiffs who would have been compensated regardless of the outcome of the dispositions, whereas in Tsakonites the
United States' interest was in subjecting all shipowners operating
from its ports to Jones Act liability commensurate with the benefits

received from its hospitality. This American interest is basically
one of preventing alien shipowners who operate from the United
States from obtaining a competitive advantage over American shipowners by securing the benefits of American residency without the
corresponding liabilities.
In the Brazilian cases, resort to a "law of the flag" type of approach was not necessary because the torts occurred during flights
which were to have taken place entirely within Brazil. The "law of
the flag" rule was developed in admiralty because of the need for a
means of providing uniformity of law to govern torts which occurred aboard ocean vessels which had to pass through numerous
jurisdictions and which spent much time on the high seas over which
4

8Tramontana v. S. A. Empresa de Visacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468

(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966); Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruziero do sul, S.A. (Cruzeiro), 245 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd per curiam, 359
E2d 855 (2d Cir. 1966).
44

Tramontana v. S. A. Empresa de Visacao Aerea Rio Grandense, supra note 43, at

469-70 n.3, 471; Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro do sul, S.A. (Cruzeiro), supranote
43, at 824-25.
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no nation has jurisdiction.4 5 The argument for uniformity and certainty is the same mechanical argument which is advanced in support of the "place of tort" rule in interstate choice of law.40
In properly applying the "grouping of contacts" to the choice of
law, the courts must evaluate the contacts qualitatively as well as

quantitatively.47

Neither the "place of the tort" nor the "law of

the flag" should be permitted to overshadow the real conflicting interests and policies. In both Lauritze4 8 and Romero,4" the Court
correctly applied the law of the flag since there were virtually no

significant contacts with the United States. In such cases there is
no reason to depart from the uniform law of .the flag rule. Tsakonites was a case which called for a departure from the law of the
flag, but, unfortunately, it did not occur. The court in fact gave
little consideration to the other contacts.50
A congressional amendment to the Jones Act clarifying its coverage would greatly assist the courts in determining when to apply
the act.5 Whether or not such an amendment is forthcoming, it is
hoped that the Supreme Court will reverse the Tsakonites decision
and itself provide the much-needed clarification as to what choiceof-law test is to be applied in international situations.
WILBUR C. LEsATHERBIERRY
45 For a discussion of this rule, see text accompanying note 10 supra.
46 See, e.g., Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594, 597 (Del. 1965).
47 In Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 633-34, 133 N.W.2d 408, 416 (1965),
the court explained that "the mere counting of contacts should not be determinative of
the law to be applied. It is rather the relevancy of the contact in terms of policy considerations important to the forum, vis--vis other contact states." Ibid.
48
Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571 (1952).
49
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
5
6 Admittedly, the court did discuss the other contacts, but because of the great
weight it assigned to the law of the flag, it reached a result which was harmful to United

States' interests and policies.
51 The statute, on its face, provides a remedy for "any seaman,' not just any American seaman, as Mr. Justice Black has pointed out in one of his dissents. Id. at 388.

